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Leading Articles
APPLICATION OF BEUTEL'S EXPERIMENTAL
JURISPRUDENCE TO JAPANESE
SOCIOLOGY OF LAW*
Shin Oikawa**
Translated by Toshira Isa
This translation of a Japanese study of an American scholar's
work in Experimental Jurisprudence is perhaps best introduced
in the words of the Japan Reading Newspaper review of February
29, 1960:
Shin Oikawa ... tries to absorb Beutel's study which is, among
the recent fruits of American Jurisprudence, inclined toward legal
realism, and he does so from the standpoint of a specialist in soc-
iology of law in Japan. Considering the present condition of
Japanese Jurisprudence, it is important to realize the necessity
that such an article be read by many people. Conclusively, his
article has important significance.
Professor Oikawa's article is presented as an interesting sup-
plement, from another part of the world, to an American venture
in law and social science.
The Editors
I. HISTORICAL AND SOCIAL BACKGROUND OF EXPERI-
MENTAL JURISPRUDENCE AS A BRANCH OF
SOCIOLOGY OF LAW IN AMERICA
This article is, in part, a continuation of the author's preced-
ing article, "The Trends of Sociology of Law in America."' The
critical sections of that article may be summed up as follows:
American sociology of law has been established upon expan-
sion of its objectives toward real society as "an application of the
* Published originally in 10 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLITICS 695
(Kvansei Gakuin University, Japan, Nov. 1959). Translated and re-
printed with permission of the author and publisher.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Law School, Kwansei Gakuin University,
Nishinomiya, Hyogo, Japan. A.B., 1950; LL.B., Tohoku University,
1952. Member of Japan Association of Sociology of Law, Private
Law, and Comparative Law.
3THE QUARTERLY LAW REVIEW 60 (No. 26, 1958).
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achievements of various social sciences, particularly of sociology."
Among some of the characteristics of American sociology of law
thus developed are rigorous practical interest, experimental posi-
tivism, and inadequacy of historical considerations. Japanese
sociology of law, when considered as an adaptation of American
sociology of law as described above, should highly evaluate scien-
tific empiricism supported by its vigorous practical interest.
The author's preceding article, concerning the achievements
of sociology of law in America after World War II, mentioned
only a few scholars such as Arthur T. Vanderbilt (1888-1914),
Roscoe Pound (1870- ), and Kenneth S. Carlston (1904- ).
If, however, the preceding article is to be expanded to show the
real achievements in sociology of law, it would seem that experi-
mental jurisprudence must be considered first. At this juncture
our attention is called to a work by Frederick K. Beutel
(1897- )2 entitled Some Potentialities of Experimental Juris-
prudence as a New Branch of Social Science, published in 1957.
Various divergent views toward such an attempt to grasp
Experimental Jurisprudence within the stream of American social
science are to be expected for the reason that Beutel's Experi-
mental Jurisprudence does not require a foundation upon sociol-
ogy of law. In view of the fact, however, that realistic jurispru-
dence, which in the past did not expect to be a part of sociology
of law, is now considered a branch of sociology of law by George
Gurvitch (1894- ) 3 and Pound,4 and more recently by N. S.
Temasheff,5 it does not seem too outrageous to study as a branch
of American sociology of law the experimental jurisprudence
which can be considered to have developed from realistic juris-
prudence,6 and neither does it seem too outrageous to undertake
a critical analysis of its system.
Thus, in order to recognize Experimental Jurisprudence as a
trend in American sociology of law from such a standpoint, we
must first grasp Beutel's Experimental Jurisprudence as a devel-
opment of realistic jurisprudence. Consequently, it seems desir-
2 Concerning Beutel's career, see Takeo Hayakawa, Experimental Jur-
isprudence-An Aspect of Contemporary Legal Thought in America,
THE QUARTERLY LAW REVIEW 12 (No. 25, 1958).
3 GURVITCH, SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 135 (1947).
4 Pound, Sociology of Law, 20TH CENTURY SOCIOLOGY 337 (1945).
5 Timasheff, Growth and Scope of Sociology of Law, MODERN SOCI-
OLOGICAL THEORY 425 (1957).
6 Takeo Hayakawa, supra note 2, at 8.
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able to describe what kind of historical and social background
lies behind the formation and development of American realistic
jurisprudence and to comment upon the position that Experi-
mental Jurisprudence occupies within the stream of such events.7
In the latter half of the nineteenth century, the rapid devel-
opment of modern industry which was ignited by the termination
of the American Civil War (1861-65) brought about the fruition
of the capitalistic economic system, which in turn forced juris-
prudence to find new areas of application. To be more specific,
jurisprudence which limited its objective only to pure "legal"
phenomena did not go beyond mere interpretation of positive law
or case law and became inapplicable to modern society. In other
words, as pointed out by Vanderbilt, within a remarkably urban-
ized and industrialized society, it became impossible for jurisprud-
ence to isolate itself from all other social sciences.8 The man who
is recognized as having pioneered realistic jurisprudence under
such circumstances is Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes (1841-1935).
Holmes insisted upon the application of the achievements of various
social sciences to the field of jurisprudence and sought to find
the function of law in the judicial process.9 His pioneering
achievements blossomed as a formative development of realistic
jurisprudence in the twentieth century.
In the twentieth century, America entered a period of fluctu-
ation. In 1917 America entered World War I, and, without en-
countering direct catastrophy, enjoyed the properity of a spectac-
7 Among such approaches attempted toward the observation of civil
law from the standpoint of sociology of law are various manuscripts
written by Prof. Fukuchi. In observing the Juridical Theory of
Rudolf von Jhering (1818-1892), he considers historical and social
regularity which provides a concrete background for logical structure
and says, "Although such things as ideology and logical concepts are
linguistic structures and cannot exist without language, the language
itself, whether it is a vocabulary or a grammatical construction, de-
rives, in its final analysis, from the vocal and symbolic expression
of the emprical facts of nature and society (their objective aspects
or mutual relationships), and is nothing but a product consciously
formed as a means of social communication. Therefore, it must be
said that ideology, logic, and conception are eventually related to,
founded upon, and defined by objective facts." Extracted from
Toshio Fukuchi, On Jhering's Juridical Theory, 8-9 JOURNAL OF
LAW AND POLITICS (Nos. 3 and 4, 1957, and No. 1, 1958).
8 VANDERBILT, MEN AND MEASURES IN THE LAW 25 (1949).
9 See the following articles in HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS
(1920); The Path of the Law, at 169; Law in Science and Science in
Law, at 210.
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ular postwar increase in the accumulation and circulation of na-
tional capital. In 1929 a heavy decline in stocks and a sudden
increase of unemployment caused social disorder and anxiety.
As a counteraction against such a period filled with fluctuation and
confusion, the formation and development of realistic jurisprud-
ence took place. Thus, Karl N. Llewellyn (1893- ) 10 who,
like Holmes, stands on sociological achievement and places heavy
emphasis upon judicial process, Jerome N. Frank (1889-1957) 11
and Roscoe Pound, who, accepting sociological achievements, lays
stress on judicial process and administrative process,' 2 have all
made outstanding contributions to the achievement of sociology
of law. It is safe to say that their studies were all directed
toward the maintenance of the balance against social change. 1 3
In 1941 America entered World War II and within only five
years magnificent economic expansion took place. At the end
of the war in 1945 she started the reduction and rebuilding of
an inflated economy which was beginning to enjoy capitalistic
prosperity. Simultaneously, cold war started between American
fronts and Communist nations, which developed into the Korean
conflict in 1950, and United States-Russian relations started
downhill. Under such circumstances, it followed as a matter of
course that America, which stands against the Soviet Union,
turned toward the strengthening and maintenance of capitalistic
prosperity, paving the way toward a modern democratic society
within the framework of the rule of law. Studies by Carlston' 4
and other realists were conducted along this line.' 5
However, along with recent rapid technological progress, which
may be symbolized by the discovery of atomic nuclei and the
invention of artificial satellites, the ups and downs of society also
became more frequent. Accordingly, the law which governs the
fluctuation of society is forced to fluctuate with it. As a result
a necessity arises for a science which contributes to legislation by
measuring the effect of law upon society through the cooperation
of various social sciences-and that is the science of legislation.
10 LEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 3 (1930).
" FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 46 (1949); PAUL, THE
LEGAL REALISM OF JEROME N. FRANK (1959).
12 Pound, supra note 4 at 300.
13 For further details see Oikawa, supra note 1, at 56.
14 CARLSTON, LAW AND STRUCTURES OF SOCIAL ACTION 71
(1956).
1 For further details see Oikawa, supra note 1, at 59.
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One of the new branches of jurisprudence, or realistic jurisprud-
ence, attempted in this social background is Beutel's Experimental
Jurisprudence.
II. BEUTEL'S SCIENTIFIC METHOD OF JURISPRUDENCE
Concerning Experimental Jurisprudence, which was formed in
an historical and social background such as that described in the
foregoing section, Beutel himself makes the following statement
showing his interest in the solution of the problem:16
For some time there has been a realization among philos-
ophers and others interested in the course of social development
that social science and government 17 were failing to inspire prac-
tical social changes comparable to those made in the application
of physical sciences and engineering. Although the last century
alone has witnessed phenomenal technical and scientific progress
on the material side, the general science and art of lawmaking,
law enforcement and government seems to have developed prac-
tically nothing new since the days of the Roman Empire. In fact,
so striking has been the failure of the philosophy of social control
and the machinery of government to keep pace with the .revolu-
tionary developments of physical science that the resulting men-
tal, political and social maladjustments have persuaded at least
one leading sociologist to classify the present age as that of the
decay of modern culture.
This failure of man to govern himself as adequately as he has
been able to achieve control over nature was dramatically illus-
trated at Hiroshima and Nagasaki where highly advanced mas-
tery over nature was graphically displayed against anarchy in
human relations. Since that time even the physical scientists,
who have long proclaimed their neutrality in matters of law and
government, have begun to fear lest they have placed God-like
destructive powers in the hands of a political animal who, due
to his absence of control over the passions and frictions of the
society in which he dives, might be so stupid as to destroy not
only that society but even humanity itself.
In the light of this obvious disproportion between man's power
over himself and over the elements about him, it might be wise
to direct attention to the question of whether or not the techniques
and knowledge so successfully developed in the physical sciences
could be transferred into the field of social control; or, putting
it another way, whether or not jurisprudence and the political and
16 BEUTEL, SOME POTENTIALITIES OF EXPERIMENTAL JURIS-
PRUDENCE AS A NEW BRANCH OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 3-4 (1957).
[Unless otherwise indicated, Prof. Beutel's footnotes are omitted
throughout this paper (Ed).]
17 "Government," according to Webster's Dictionary, means the mode or
system of governing, that is, the governing system embracing the
functions of legislation, jurisdiction and administration. It is in this
sense that the term is used in this paper.
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social sciences could be placed on a footing and subjected to
methods of study and control similar to those which prevail in
physical, biological and medical sciences....
Although Beutel's words just quoted are in themselves quite
plain, his methodic approach and, furthermore, his timely interest
in Experimental Jurisprudence are revealed by those words. This
is to say that Beutel, realizing the importance of the reality of
present society which is characterized by "the lag in social science
and government," turns his attention toward natural science, which
already possesses a system of remarkably developed techniques
and knowledge, and asks "whether scientific method may be applied
to jurisprudence" as a means of coping with such problems. In
other words, Beutel is emphasizing the necessity of creating Experi-
mental Jurisprudence from a realistic standpoint. However, the
question of whether or not Beutel's Experimental Jurisprudence
is worth applying to sociology of law in Japan must be preserved
until his methodology has been discussed.
We are now about to discuss Beutel's methodology, but what
must be examined at this juncture is his conception of law, because
these is a possibility of "mutual relation between object and meth-
od,"'i s that is, Beutel's method of Experimental Jurisprudence
may be closely related to what he means by the word "law."
Now the word "law" is being used with a very vague conno-
tation, as readers may already know, not only in the field of
jurisprudence but also within the field of sociology of law. The
author has once touched briefly upon this point,19 but Beutel
analyzes the meaning of this word by putting it into four cate-
gories: 2 0
1. Law as used in its usual sense refers to a means of social
control, a statute, ordinance, court decision, traffic light, etc.; it
is in no sense scientific. It may or may not be the result of a
scientific process of experimentation, but in essence it is simply
a social or governmental phenomenon.
2. There is also the so-called "Law Behind the Law" or the
ideal "Natural Law." This is believed by some to be a collection
of rules which all laws as a means of social control should ap-
proximate.
3. Another use of the term can be found in the so-called
"Scientific Law," which merely states that under given circum-
18 RADBRUCH, RECHTSPHILOSOPIE (FUNFTE AUFLAGE) § 98
(1956).
10 Oikawa, The Conception of "Law" in Sociology of Law and Its Ap-
plication to a Field Research, 10 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLITICS
5 (No. 2, 1959).
20 See BEUTEL, op. cit. supra note 16, at 15-16.
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stances there will be a given sequence of events. For example,
an unsupported object will fall to the ground, or perhaps a highly
unpopular law cannot be enforced against the will of an active
majority.
4. A fourth meaning inheres in the expression "Jural Law,"'21
which is a statement of a scientific law as it applies to the se-
quence or pattern of social reactions which actually follow, or
which it is predicted will follow, the enactment of a particular
law. ...
It may be seen that what Beutel advocates is a fourth item, jural
law, and according to him it is the jural law that indicates the
scientific generalities to be derived from the examination of laws
in society. With the intention of developing an experimental
jurisprudence which possesses those characteristics mentioned a-
bove, Beutel takes a critical view toward various older theories
of jurisprudence by setting up the following hypothesis: 22
For the purpose of developing such a science, it may be
tentatively assumed that law is a man-made instrument of social
control devised to accomplish the purpose of the lawmaker. It
cannot be exclusively characterized as either the inevitable work-
ing of history, the immutable will of God, the command of the
sovereign, the ultimate embodiment of justice, the will of the
governed, the result of uncontrollable forces or the proper ad-
justment of social interests. 23 Under different conditions and
circumstances there is probably an element of truth in each of
these explanations given by the various schools of jurisprudence,
but none of them can be accepted as the whole truth. Further-
more, little is to be gained by a debate as to which if any of them
is the dominant explanation of the phenomena of law....
Beutel, as quoted above, does not become deeply involved
in a discussion of the concept of law, but rather concentrates his
attention upon how it and the institutions surrounding it function.
Just as physicists cannot define electricity, but work constantly
21 When Friedmann uses the term "legal" in his work, LEGAL THEORY
(1953) and when Pound uses "legal order" in contrast to "jural order"
in the Preface to his SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (1947), they give a
broader meaning to "legal" than to "jural." Therefore, it seems rea-
sonable to translate the former "Hoteki" and the latter "Horitsu-teki."
22 See BEUTEL, op. cit. supra note 16, at 17.
23 Beutel lists the following as describing such matters: MAINE, AN-
CIENT LAW (4th Am. ed. 1906); CICERO, DE LEGIBUS 379-81;
BROWN, THE AUSTINIAN THEORY OF LAW (1906); STAV/ILER,
THE THEORY OF JUSTICE (1925); 5 JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 115-
24 (Ford ed. 1899); CARTER, LAW: ITS ORIGIN, GROWTH AND
FUNCTION (1907); CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 112-15 (1921); JHERING, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN
END (Husik's transl. 1913); POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH
LAW 63-80 (1942).
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to see what it does, so also the experimental jurist pays far more
attention to the effect of law than to its definition. Putting it
another way, when the "phenomena surrounding law" are more
accurately understood, the definition of law will establish itself.
Such is the nature of Experimental Jurisprudence. When we
compare this with the theories of sociology of law by Eugene
Ehrlich (1862-1922) ,24 Gurvitch,2 5 Max Weber (1864-1920) 26 and
Theodor Geiger (1891-1952)27 who attempted to establish a mag-
nificent theoretical system upon the footing of a rigid conceptual
structure of law, we can see the depth of Beutel's practical interest
in Experimental Jurisprudence.
Beutel's methodology seems quite reasonable from the view-
point of social science or of scientific sociology of law for the
reason that the word "law" itself is an abstract concept and is a
conceptual tool which is given its meaning by the way in which
the word is applied.28 From such a viewpoint Experimental Juris-
24 Ehrlich's representative work GRUNDLEGUNG DES SOZIOLOGIE
DES RECHTS (1913) has been partially translated by Takeyoshi
Kawashima (1952). Concerning his theoretical system, see TETSU
ISOMIURA, EHRLICH'S SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (1953).
25 Gurvitch's representative work SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (1947) has been
translated by Toshitaka and Susato (1956). ,Concerning his theoret-
ical system, see Tobizawa, System of Gurvitch's Sociology of Law, 3
JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLITICS - (1952); and Tobizawa, Sys-
tem of Gurvitch's Legal Thought, 6-7 JOURNAL OF LAW AND
POLITICS - (1955-56).
2 ) Max Weber's representative work RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE IN WIRT-
SCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFT (1922) has been translated by
Yoshihisa Ishio (1957) and Jyo Onogi (1958). Concerning his theo-
retical system, see Kawamura, Introduction to Weber's Sociology of
Law, 6 SOCIOLGY OF LAW - (1955).
27 Concerning Geiger's theoretical system, see his representative book
VORSTUDIEN ZU EINER SOZIOLOGIE DES RECHTS (1947).
28s From such a standpoint Takeyoshi Kawashima says, "The question of
what people have been calling law ('law' as a social phenomenon) is
quite different from the question of how sociology of law as an em-
pirical science should define the concept of law regarding it as an
analytical tool. Although the word 'law' has had, in general, two
meanings mentioned previously, its meaning has much nuance when
applied more specifically and has various interpretations.
"It is, therefore, impossible to use this word as an analytical tool
without defining its meaning specifically. However, the concept of
law as a means of analysis is something that is formed and defined
by scholars for the sake of analysis so that it is useless, at least to
empirical science, to argue about the definition of the concept with-
out considering the effectiveness of analysis which is performed by
means of the tool concept." I SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 86 (1958).
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prudence, as a science of law, attempts to define the concept of
law through scientific studies of the effect and effectiveness of
law as it applies to society without detailed analysis of the nature
of law. Consequently, the scientific method of Experimental Juris-
prudence must next be considered.
Beutel lists the following six series of activities as scientific
methods: 2
9
1. Observation, and identification of the sensations.
2. An attempt to explain the activity apparent in the sen-
sations. Such an explanation is commonly called a hypothesis.
3. Further observations to check the accuracy of the hypoth-
esis; in attempting these observations, scientists have invented
many mechanical means to increase the accuracy and the pene-
tration of sensory perception, for example, the telescope, the
microscope, the camera, the X-ray, and myriad other gadgets
and processes, all of which permit observation and checking to
an extent far beyond that of the unassisted human senses.
4. When a series of observations offers a vertification 3O or
check of the hypothesis, it is taken to be a statement of tentative
scientific fact.
5. This statement is then enlarged to include other phen-
omena similar to the one tested, and if it works there, we some-
times speak of the explanation as a scientific law.
6. Usually when the hypothesis is so extended it soon en-
counters a situation which it no longer explains. The hypothesis
is then remodeled in an attempt to explain this new phenomenon,
and the process of observation, checking and verification is again
repeated.
Since this scientific method mentioned by Beutel has already
been discussed by some realistic American sociologists of law, it
cannot exactly be said to be a new method,3 1 but we can under-
stand the scientific positivism in his own methodology when we
look at his statement, ". . . the progress of science has been
marked by the wrecks of hypotheses; far more have been disproved
than verified, and none has yet been created which will stand
up against all tests and conditions."32  In the next section we
Furthermore, Geiger points out that as long as we maintain sim-
ply the linguistic idiom (Sprachgebrauch) or a commonly known
daily concept (alltagsvorstellung), we cannot essentially define the
concept of law (Rechtsbegriff). GEIGER, op. cit. supra note 27, § 9.
29 BEUTEL, op. cit supra note 16, at 4-5.
30 The quotation is correct. "Verification" is evidently intended. [Ed.]
31 CARLSTON, op. cit. supra note 14, at 53.
32 BEUTEL, op. cit. supra note 16, at 5. See also, Oikawa, The Study of
"Law" Phenomena on Empirical Science, 9 JOURNAL OF LAW AND
POLITICS 44 (1959).
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shall see how Beutel has introduced scientific method into his
Experimental Jurisprudence.
III. THE SOLUTION OF SOME LEGAL PROBLEMS
BY APPLICATION OF THE METHOD OF
EXPERIMENTAL JURISPRUDENCE
In applying the scientific method just described to Experi-
mental Jurisprudence, Beutel lists the following eight steps: 3 3
1. The nature of the phenomena which law attempts to reg-
ulate should be studied. In particular, the social problem to which
a specific law is directed should be carefully isolated and ex-
amined.
2. The rule of law or other method used to regulate the
phenomena or intended to solve the social problem should be
accurately stated.
3. The effect on society of adopting the rule should be ob-
served and measured.
4. There should then be constructed a hypothesis that at-
tempts to explain the reasons for this reaction.
5. This description, when broadened to apply to other anal-
ogous situations, might be considered a jural law that describes
or predicts results which would occur on application of a similar
regulatory law to similar problems.
6. If analysis shows that the law is inefficient, there could
then be suggested new methods of accomplishing the originally
desired result.
7. The proposed new law could be enacted and the process
repeated.
8. A series of such adoptions of new laws and the study of
their results might throw important light upon the usefulness
of the underlying purposes behind the enactment, thus effecting
a possible alteration in or abandonment of this objective, or in
the long run, though this now appears doubtful, even induce a
revision of our present scale of social and political ethics.
As clearly seen in Beutel's statement, Experimental Juris-
prudence is essentially a study for the purpose of solving prob-
lems. Consequently, Experimental Jurisprudence should be em-
ployed in detailed observation and analysis or to establish and
examine postulates based upon data related to social phenomena.
In other words, Experimental Jurisprudence is a science of law
whose purpose is to engage itself in problem-solving through
careful examination of the factual elements of the phenomena
toward which a particular law is directed. The first step in the
methodology of scientific jurisprudence, therefore, must be a
33 BEUTEL, op. cit. supra note 16, at 18-19.
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careful isolation of relatively simple problems. It naturally fol-
lows that in determining the nature of the problem in question
as a social phenomenon it often becomes necessary to employ
various other sciences. From this standpoint Beutel observes: 34
It is obvious that a traffic study involves mechanical
knowledge and some psychology, while a juvenile delinquency
problem calls for the help of doctors, psychiatrists and psycholo-
gists. Similarly, studies of bad checks and rent control will use
economic data. In fact, an adequate analysis of any problem will
require aid from many of the modern sciences to expose the im-
plications of its basic facts.
Beutel's Experimental Jurisprudence thus attempts the solu-
tion of specific problems. Although Beutel has analyzed numer-
ous problems, let us limit our interest to the traffic problem at
this time and look at his specific examples under the second
step: 35
Once the problem is isolated, it may then be easy to discover
what legal devices have actually been created for its solution.
In the case of a dangerous corner, many are available. To name
only a few, there are city ordinances creating stop lights and stop
signs, assigning traffic officers for busy hours, designating one-
way streets, prohibiting right or left turns or both, and ordering
the construction of overhead crossings and bypasses. ...
Thirdly (as in observation of a particular fact on a particular
corner), the patterns of social action caused by the impact of a
legal device on the comparatively simple phenomenon of the
movement of vehicular and pedestrian traffic at the corner is
readily observable. Here mechanical counters, statistics, motion
picture cameras and the like are useful in assembling the pattern
of traffic before and after a change in the law.
Fourthly, scientific imagination, speculation and intuition be-
gin to assert themselves. The formulation of a hypothesis to ex-
plain the pattern of group or individual actions revealed by re-
search may be a simple or complex, but not impossible, task. For
example, if a one-way street or an overhead crossing is estab-
lished, the results are obvious, and the reaction of society to the
rule of law can be explained with little difficulty.
As a fifth step, after a hypothesis concerning the effect of the
law on a single situation has been constructed, the hypothesis
may be capable of enlargement into a proper jural law. Thus it
may be determined that under certain conditions traffic lights
eliminate a percentage of accidents on busy crossings, while it is
34 Id. at 20.
35 Ibid.
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certain that an overhead pass will entirely eliminate traffic acci-
dents caused by collisions at intersections.
The sixth step in Experimental Jurisprudence is reached
when, after observations of the reactions of people to a particular
law or class of laws have been collected and formalized, it is pos-
sible for the jurist to point out inefficiencies in both the adminis-
tration of the law and its technical structure.
This leads us to the seventh step, in which it becomes possible
for the jurist to suggest to statesmen or to other 'policy-makers
changes in the law which might better effectuate the policy for
which it was created.36 However, under our present govern-
mental system the legislative body is an independent organization
and is in no way obligated to the jurist. Consequently, there is
little hope that the experimental jurist's new reform plan based
on his scientific analysis would ever be considered, and if it were
enacted, he would be lucky.
Beutel, recognizing this situation, suggests the eighth step as
a practical means of overcoming this legislative lag. Beutel sub-
divides this step into three parts as follows: 37
The first is delegation by the legislature of rule-making
power to officials with authority to change current rules of law.
Where the lawmaking power is thus delegated to an official, he is
able to experiment with the subject matter under his jurisdiction,
to change rules or to invent legal devices.
Second, in the case of the United States, since most of the
legal and administrative variations which an experimental jurist
might seek to effectuate have already been enacted in legal units
of similar structure, it becomes necessary to make comparisons
with other states or foreign countries.
Third, the legislative body as it is organized today enacts the
"change of law" by itself, thus placing its existence outside the
realm of experimental jurists. However, should careful scientific
studies indicate a change in direction or policy, they are likely to
be the most persuasive argument to all but an emotionally blinded
lawmaker.
In line with these eight steps, Beutel, in his chapter titled
"Experimental Jurisprudence in Action,"3s attempts further de-
30 Id. at 29.
37 Id. at 29-32.
38 Id. at 115-38.
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tailed studies of the problem of traffic control. His concluding
remarks are worthy of attention as being indicative of the general
applicability of Experimental Jurisprudence: 39
This rapidly developing science points out the direction that
can be taken to develop other fields of the law. The many sci-
entifically controlled devices here indicate that it is possible for
scientific jurisprudence to create a new legal system which will
make our present methods of social control look as obsolete as a
country road when compared to a modern Autobahn.
Lastly, it should be Temembered that this is not merely local,
but, like other science, is being applied in engineering projects
all over the world.
Although the basic nature of Beutel's method of Experimental
Jurisprudence has been revealed, the system does not limit itself
to the area described above. It turns further toward the value of
the purpose with which legal policy is concerned. Let us now
read Beutel's opinion on this matter: 40
Philosophers, clerics and students of ethics have devoted
much attention to what they call the basic values or purposes for
which law and other social regulations exist. These values have
been postulated in the form of hedonism, the greatest happiness
for the greatest number; materialism, the largest pile of tangible
assets; idealism, the development of the things of the spirit; and
in other ways too numerous to mention. Or, to state it another
way, these lovers of generality may say that the purpose of law
is race power, national aggrandizement, spiritual or intellectual
advancement, the preservation of freedom, the development of
the state, the rule of the proletariat, the perpetuation of the no-
bility and so on. Legal philosophers like to think that when the
lawmaker comes to his ultimate decision, he consciously turns to
these ethical sources or else relies on intuition based upon his
early conditioning in morals.
In the past there may have been some truth in this theory.
Any realist, however, can see that, even without a system of
Experimental Jurisprudence which would place the facts at issue
before the lawmaker, statements of these ultimate values are
often rationalizations which come after decisions which have al-
ready been made on much more practical grounds. ...
As we can see, Beutel refuses to place policy problems upon the
footing of either extreme idealism or ethical standards.
Within a dimension divorced from dependence on value, or
putting it another way, on the plane of interests which can be
measured in terms of number, volume and force, experimental
jurists provide the means to resolve the eternal struggle for the
39 Id. at 136.
40 Id. at 32-33.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 39, 1960
change of law. Accordingly, Beutel insists that lawmakers and
jurists need not be deeply involved with ultimate value. He
says: 41
It appears then that the term "value" serves no purpose in
Experimental Jurisprudence. Its continued use in the language
makes it very much like the term "phlogiston" which all physi-
cists once used to describe an element which they believed was
necessary for explaining the phenomenon of fire; but, as has been
suggested, just as physics now gets along without phlogiston, a
descriptive and experimental social science can do without the
term "value." All that is necessary is to discover the actual con-
dition of the interests or demands of people in society to expose
the need for granting the demands which they make, and to choose
the legal devices which will be useful for making possible the
fulfillment of the desires represented by the choices, with the
least social friction.
As shown in this quotation, Beutel denies the entry of "value"
into Experimental Jurisprudence, while he insists that the isola-
tion and examination of the things called "interests" are useful
for the creation of law.
As a result, from this viewpoint, Beutel classifies the inter-
ests of an individual or group of individuals into three categories
according to the degree of intensity with which they affect the
law: demand, desire, and needs. Particular emphasis is placed
upon needs. The reason, according to Beutel, is that if they are
present and effective needs they will cause the individual or so-
ciety to function with the least friction and more in accord with
the natural order.
Thus, Experimental Jurisprudence provides the means of dis-
covering and measuring demand, desire, and needs; indicates the
way of deciding which one of them should be fulfilled; and makes
possible the creation of a technique of choosing the policy best
calculated for enacting the necessary change of law.
Experimental Jurisprudence, thus characterized, should an-
swer at least three questions about law: 42
(1) To what extent does it satisfy the demands which brought
it into existence? (2) Does it acccomplish the express purposes
for which the lawmaker enacted it? (3) How does it affect the
needs of the people whom it governs?
Beutel concludes the methodology of Experimental Jurispru-
dence with the following:43
41 Id. at 44.
42 Id. at 53.
43 Id. at 55-56.
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In short, Experimental Jurisprudence, when properly applied,
can now be expected only to test the efficiency of a law in attain-
ing the particular ends for which it was adopted and in turn can
state the results which will follow various attempts to reach such
ends. The data thus accumulated may throw great light on the
ultimate usefulness of the objectives and the effectiveness of
the means used to attain them. The ethical problem of what, in
the abstract, is the ultimate good is not likely ever to come within
the ken of Experimental Jurisprudence; it is today too far re-
moved to require consideration.
Jurisprudence as a science of ethical values, norms and the
like can have no function, in light of the present state of re-
search techniques, other than that of philosophical speculation.
Such speculation may be exceedingly interesting and may result
in highly suggestive working hypotheses, but it can never have
any true scientific usefulness until it is put to the acid test of
practical application by means of social control applied under the
careful observation of scientists. In this way pragmatic ethics
may become a living reality through the development of the tech-
nique of Experimental Jurisprudence.
When a so-called value judgment is approached, the question
should be: "Value for the solution of what social problem? "; if
the problem is then carefully identified, its factual basis studied
and the scientific and jural laws surrounding its phenomena
developed, the question of value as a philosophical speculation or
political issue will usually be found to have vanished.44
Beutel attempts to establish a scientific experimental juris-
prudence which has freed itself from dependence on value. Of
course it would be safe to say that the problems which Experi-
mental Jurisprudence encounters are various in nature, that the
44 Concerning this point Masashi Chiba states as follows: "In general,
it would be fair to say that sociology of law has developed as it
solved the problems created by criticisms and accusations often
raised from various fields. However, there is one big problem that
has never been turned toward solution since it was raised and that
is the methodology of research. Above all else, the question of why
it is necessary to conduct research must be explained logically and
systematically, starting from the need for the accumulation of scien-
tific data. Furthermore, in order to make research an objective and
scientific project instead of a subjective and accidental one, a system
of proper research method must be prepared. Concerning the prob-
lem of the need for research, there has been no significant discussion
even among other sciences which are performing research investiga-
tions, but concerning the problem of the method of research, there
has been great progress in other sciences, especially in sociology and
anthropology in America and Great Britain. At least the question of
whether it is necessary to look at these problems for the develop-
ment of sociology of law as a science has been more or less ignored.
We should exert our efforts toward the solution of these problems
even today." CHIBA, SOCIOLOGY OF LAW AND THE THEORY
OF PROVINCIAL STRUCTURES 78 (1956).
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realm of investigation is extensive, and that Experimental Juris-
prudence is indeed in the process of formation. Whatever the
case may be, it seems important for any Japanese sociology of
law to consider critically Beutel's Experimental Jurisprudence,
and from this standpoint some discussions on his Experimental
Jurisprudence will be developed in the following section.
IV. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF BEUTEL'S EXPERIMENTAL
JURISPRUDENCE FROM THE STANDPOINT
OF JAPANESE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW
The author has endeavored to describe Beutel's Experimental
Jurisprudence, and, as a result, it should be seen that experi-
mental positivism based upon rigorous practical interest penet-
rates his methodology. It can be easily pointed out that Beutel's
Experimental Jurisprudence-or, in general, realistic jurispru-
dence as a branch of American sociology of law-places its foot-
ing upon pragmatism. In other words, it seems to show that the
pragmatism of William James (1842-1910), 45 an experimental
positivist who turned from the abstract to facts, was succeeded by
that of John Dewey (1859-1952) and Holmes .4  This in turn was
developed by realistic jurists and exerted great influence upon
Experimental Jurisprudence. Beutel himself mentions in his Pre-
face that his Experimental Jurisprudence was inspired by such
writers as Williams James, John Dewey and Roscoe Pound.4 7
From this starting point Beutel's Experimental Jurisprudence is
formed.
Now the basic idea that Beutel directs toward the solution of
legal problems, as has already been mentioned, is how law or
rules of law act, not on a sheet of paper, but upon real social
phenomena. Seeking a solution, Beutel turns his attention to
various other sciences which study human behavior in society.
He then attempts to apply the methods of those sciences to the
science of law. Needless to say, this does not mean that a jurist
must also be a psychologist or a physicist, but it does mean
that there must be departmental cooperation among various sci-
ences. This has often been emphasized in Japanese sociology of
law in the past.48
45 JAMES, PRAGMATISM 51 (1925).
46 See, e.g., PAUL, op. cit. supra note 11, at 18.
47 See BEUTEL, op. cit. supra note 16, at vii.
4s For instance, Takeyoshi Kawashima has pointed this out by saying,
"Thus far jurisprudence has maintained an 'Honorable Isolation' ...
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In view of the expectation that with the progress of natural
science, Japanese social phenomena may experience rapid change,
the idea just described should be kept in mind, not only by Japan-
ese sociology of law, but also by jurisprudence in general.
To mention some critical views next, the first point that may
be brought out would be the weakness of historical considerations
resulting from heavy emphasis on the solution of realistic prob-
lems. In other words, as mentioned previously, Beutel, in study-
ing the law that acts and functions, does not consider the investi-
gation of the social factors which formed the law, but instead
concentrates his effort upon the social effect or effectiveness of
the law which has been formed. Historical observations-such as
how various powers (Machte) related to the formation of law
(Rechtsbilding) influenced the development of the formal na-
ture of law, as once brought up by Max Weber 49-have been
abandoned. Therefore, Beutel's Experimental Jurisprudence can-
not avoid the criticism that it is indifferent to historical consid-
erations, while on the other hand, it should not be ignored that
his Experimental Jurisprudence has been formed upon the histor-
ical social background of the American nation which places reli-
ance upon the "rule of law."
Secondly, attention is called to the fact that Beutel does not
discuss 5° groups or organizations as social nuclei which produce
the various powers that law creates. Of course, as was mentioned
before, the ideology of class harmony directed toward America's
strengthening and maintenance of world-wide welfare exists be-
hind Beutel's Experimental Jurisprudence, as revealed in Beutel's
own words: "Once the process of Experimental Jurisprudence is
adopted and perfected in this and other fields, it is foreseeable
that its results can be as startling and useful to human welfare
but the situation is different when it comes to the sociology of law.
It approaches the same objective as that of various social sciences--
social phenomena as facts-in an equally realistic manner, and it can
continue its own study only when it stands on the footing of the re-
search findings of various social sciences, while at the same time its
own research findings may make some contribution to the study of
social sciences.
"Furthermore, it is such mutual promotion and cooperation that
is the duty of sociology of law which owes much to the development
of social science." KAWASHIMA, EXISTENTIAL STRUCTURE OF
LAW 39 (1950).
49 WEBER, op. cit. supra note 26, § 397.
5o But see BEUTEL, op cit. supra note 16, at 48-50 [Ed.].
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as have been the fruits of scientific method in other areas."51 It
is, however, doubtful whether it is thus possible to solve various
problems in "organizational structure"5 2 which have appeared in
modern capitalistic society. Especially in the present situation in
Japan where labor unions and capitalist groups are set up against
each other and various profit organizations exert pressure on leg-
islation, the analysis of reality without consideration of groups or
organizations would lead to an inaccurate understanding of social
phenomena.
Thirdly, Beutel attempts to establish an experimental juris-
prudence free from dependence on value, but there arises a
question on this point, for as Talcott Parsons (1902- ) main-
tains"-2 what exists or is believed to exist (existential), what
self or others want (desire), and what self or others should want
(the desirable)-the existence of three fundamental types of
experience is a fact that can be verified by introspection and
observation, and value is also revealed in the moral and aesthetic
standards clearly indicated by ideas, expressional symbols, and
behavioral regularity. Therefore, social science, and also socio-
scientific sociology of law cannot but be interested in the problem
of value. As in one view, 54 for example, the ultimate value is
related to the basic necessary conditions of society such as health,
sex, reproduction, authority, dignity, leadership, usefulness, prop-
erty, knowledge, beauty, ideology, and so forth.
From such a standpoint, the terminologies used by Beutel,
namely demand, desire, and need, should be understood in the
light of the relationship between value and social actions. Does
not Beutel's attempt to erase the problem of value from Experi-
mental Jurisprudence indicate a rather narrow-minded behavior-
ism?
Thus, three critical points are raised as matters to be con-
sidered when Japanese sociology of law deals with Beutel's Ex-
perimental Jurisprudence. But even if his Experimental Juris-
prudence may have some defects, his methodology based on ex-
perimental positivism must be evaluated carefully. Particularly
under present conditions where the realistic situations of Japanese
51 BEUTEL,op. cit. supra note 16, at 418.
52 See CARLSTON, op. cit. supra note 14, at 267.
53 PARSONS & SHILLS, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF ACTION
394 (1952).
54 Murray, Toward a Classification of Interaction, in PARSONS &
SHILLS, Id. at 463.
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society are demanding an experimental science of law based upon
a method other than that which has been used by jurisprudence
in the past (although sociology of law aims mainly at fulfilling
such demand), 55 the author believes that the scientific method
Beutel attempted in Experimental Jurisprudence should be intro-
duced as a method of resolving the present legal situation in so-
ciology of law in Japan.*
55 "The sociology of law, in its name and in its essence, cannot be said
to have been non-existent before the War, and it certainly is not
something that suddenly surfaced after the War. However, the cold,
hard fact of the surrender and the rapid movement and changes that
followed it in various phases of life stirred up suspicions and criti-
cisms toward rule of law and its logic based on the absolutistic system
that had existed, thus resulting in a new and powerful closeup view
of the sociology of law as a science that attempts to take a new look
at the essence and the function of law." Suekawa, Sociology of Law
as a New Science, 26 THE QUARTERLY LAW REVIEW 1 (1959).
* The author wishes to add: "Many criticisms have been sent to the
author from jurists. Above all, Masashi Chiba gave useful opinions
for the author's translation of the American words "legal," "law,"
etc. F. K. Beutel, who discussed the article on the point of scholar-
ship, commented on two important matters in Part IV. Thus, foot-
note 50 has been added." (May 2, 1960). [Ed.]
